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The Computable General Equilibrium model, based on the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, is used to evaluate the impact of 
separate bilateral free trade agreements by Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru with the United States of America (USA). As the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) is to expire shortly, a 
number of different scenarios have been analyzed: full liberalization, 
liberalization excluding sensitive products and non-conclusion of 
agreements. Signature of the agreements would lead to a widespread 
increase in trade among the negotiating countries to the detriment of 
their Andean partners. While the effects on welfare would benefit only 
the United States and Peru, from the capital accumulation standpoint 
they are clearly positive for all countries. Research shows that, while 
these agreements would not be enough on their own to trigger a process 
of sustained development, an active economic and social policy could 
usefully tap their potential.
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There is widespread consensus that free trade agreements 
lead to increased exports and production levels in the 
short to medium term and provide an opportunity 
to introduce an analysis of productive development 
agendas, including competitiveness. However, some 
regional experiences have shown that dynamic export 
growth does not go hand-in-hand with equally dynamic 
growth rates in gross domestic product (GDP), meaning 
that additional policies are needed to accompany 
liberalization and efforts to access new markets. During 
the process of trade opening and signature of free 
trade agreements, new opportunities also bring with 
them the challenge of how to minimize or mitigate 
the adverse effects on the least competitive sectors of 
the greater exposure to global competition entailed by 
trade opening.
In the short term, the net effect that will determine 
whether trade liberalization is beneficial to a country 
will be established on the basis of its impact on welfare. 
This will be the result of a combination of sometimes 
opposing factors, including: (i) the trend in the terms 
of trade and changes in relative prices; (ii) the effects 
on tax revenues and their use; (iii) a country’s pattern 
of production specialization; (iv) winner and loser 
sectors; (v) the predominant types of employment 
and the level of technology in the sectors and (vi) the 
distribution of added value among the various factors 
of production. The effects on production costs and the 
timely availability of factors of production and inputs 
will also be key factors in effectively exploiting the 
new dynamic created by free trade agreements.
The inclusion of long-term elements, such as 
attracting greater foreign investment, technological 
change arising from easier access to high-technology 
capital goods, possible reductions in country-risk 
premiums in response to a better reputation and a 
reduction in the monopoly power of sectors exposed 
to stiffer competition as a result of trade opening, 
can create additional dynamic benefits that qualify, 
accentuate or reverse the short-term results.
The main objective of this study is to evaluate the 
socio-economic effects that would occur as a result of 
three Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) 
concluding separate free trade agreements (FTA) with 
the United States. The process of negotiating bilateral 
agreements with the United States is not confined 
to the Andean countries but responds, in part, to an 
international context that is both political (geostrategic 
interests and competition by areas of influence) and 
commercial (multilateral negotiations are stalled). In 
fact, the scant success with negotiations within the 
multilateral trade system, following the skepticism 
generated at the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Ministerial Conference in Cancun and the timid 
advances made at the WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Hong Kong, has led to a wave of bilateral and 
multilateral free trade agreements.
At present, the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries continue to negotiate a large number of 
preferential free trade agreements of varying types 
with countries from inside and outside the region. 
By September 2006, around 70 trade intra- and 
extraregional agreements had been concluded, not 
counting those still under negotiation. All of these 
agreements and their corresponding negotiation 
processes have generated centrifugal and centripetal 
forces that tend to unite or divide the process of 
regional integration respectively. Thus, one political 
consequence of the free trade agreement negotiations 
by three Andean countries with the United States, and 
specifically the conclusion of negotiations in the cases 
of Peru (November 2005) and Colombia (April 2006), 
has been the decision by the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela to formally withdraw from the Andean 
Community (AC). However, this study does include 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela among the AC 
members when counting the regional aggregates, since 
the simulation exercises were conducted prior to the 
country’s withdrawal. 
The negotiation process for the free trade 
agreements in this study has not been easy. From the 
very outset, the negotiations have been plagued by 
innumerable tensions. Indigenous peoples, peasant 
farmers, small-producer organizations, trade unions and 
many social movements moved to halt the progress of 
I
Introduction
 The authors are grateful for the useful comments provided by 
Robert Devlin, André Hofman, Felipe Jiménez, José Luis Machinea, 
Watanuki Masakazu, Osvaldo Rosales, María Inés Terra, Sara Wong 
and an anonymous judge.
69
TRADE AGREEMENTS BY COLOMBIA, ECUADOR AND PERU WITH THE UNITED STATES: EFFECTS ON TRADE, PRODUCTION 
AND WELFARE  •  JOSÉ E. DURÁN LIMA, CARLOS J. DE MIGUEL AND ANDRÉS R. SCHUSCHNY
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 1  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 7
the negotiations. The negotiations were viewed as a huge 
concession to United States economic and geopolitical 
interests. This is why we feel that it is appropriate to 
conduct as objective as possible a quantitative evaluation 
of the consequences of concluding these agreements 
for the three countries involved in the negotiations. 
This study therefore analyses the macroeconomic and 
sectoral effects (GDP, exports, imports and intraregional 
trade), as well as their impact in terms of welfare. The 
database of the Global Trade Analysis Project (version 
6.1) and the associated computable general equilibrium 
model were used. As the base year for the original GTAP 
database was 2001, the information on tariff protection 
was updated to 2004 in order to reflect the current 
situation regarding all the preferential agreements 
and tariff reductions in force in the region. This was 
the reference year used for the simulation exercises. 
Thus, our benchmark scenario already incorporates 
the effects of the unilateral preferences granted by the 
United States under the Andean Trade Promotion and 
Drug Eradication Act, so it is possible to filter the real 
effects of the agreements under negotiation.
It is important to note that, as with any application of 
the computable general equilibrium model, the simulation 
exercises in this study do not consider the possible effects 
of non-commercial aspects of a free trade agreement 
(such as services, investments, public procurement, 
intellectual property or competition policy), which for 
some countries are even more important than the purely 
commercial aspects. Furthermore, as they are static 
simulation exercises, their added value lies in identifying 
“winner” and “loser” sectors, regions and agents. These 
are therefore short to medium term results that do not 
allow growth paths to be deduced nor possible dynamic 
effects to be incorporated.1 Even though the model 
faithfully reflects the system of prices and quantities, as 
well as the public policies applied (in this case free trade 
agreements), it does not incorporate the institutional, 
cultural, administrative, business and other elements 
that are also key to exploiting the static and dynamic 
advantages of a trade agreement and to mitigating adverse 
effects. Although these limitations do not invalidate the 
results, they do limit the scope of interpretation and call 
for caution in the use of the model. 
In summary, this study uses a computable general 
equilibrium model to analyse the direct and indirect 
effects of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru concluding 
bilateral free trade agreements with the United 
States, in three static and two dynamic scenarios. In 
the main static scenario, the three Andean countries 
(hereafter referred to as AC3) and the United States 
fully liberalize their trade reciprocally (“AC3-USA 
full liberalization”). Next, two alternative scenarios 
are simulated: one that excludes sensitive products 
(“AC3-USA excluding sensitives”) and another where no 
agreement is concluded and ATPDEA benefits from the 
United States are terminated (“No FTA/end ATPDEA”). 
This non-signature scenario could be considered as 
an alternative to the scenario of signing free trade 
agreements. The “AC3-USA full liberalization” and 
“No FTA/end ATPDEA” scenarios are also simulated 
dynamically.
Section II of this article describes the key variations 
between the AC countries’ trade policies, highlighting 
the main reasons that prompted them to engage in 
negotiations with the United States. The section also 
reviews literature on the computable general equilibrium 
model in the region and in the AC countries. Section 
III describes the model’s characteristics and the details 
of country and product aggregations, as well as of the 
simulation scenarios analysed. Section IV presents 
the main results. Lastly, Section V makes a number 
of conclusions and discusses the economic policy 
implications.
1 At the end of the study, the simulation results are analysed 
in a “dynamic” version of the model, based on a steady-state 
representation.
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1. Trade strategy of the Andean countries
The AC countries’ trade policy has developed in three 
directions: towards unilateral, bilateral and multilateral 
liberalization. Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, 
the Andean countries unilaterally reduced their average 
tariff levels from more than 40% to around 12%.
Another pillar of liberalization was regional 
integration. In 1969, the Andean countries concluded 
the Cartagena Agreement in a determined bid to 
achieve greater commercial and industrial integration. 
This initiative was inspired by policies of import 
substitution-led industrialization, which was very 
much in vogue at the time. However, integration 
ground to a halt without achieving any tangible results 
until 1991. During the 1980s, the Andean subregion 
found it very hard to comply with tariff reduction 
commitments. In response to the initiative of the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in 1991, 
the member countries of the Andean Pact agreed to 
relaunch the integration initiative. So, as from 1992, 
somewhat deeper integration was achieved among 
Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, having been given new impetus 
by the free trade agreement concluded by Colombia 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in the same 
year. A free trade zone among the member countries 
which had been in operation since 1993 was turned 
into an (albeit imperfect) Customs Union in 1995. The 
new challenge of globalization made it necessary to 
deepen integration by introducing a common external 
tariff. However, this process is still ongoing.2
Trade between the AC countries has increased since 
the free trade zone came into force (1993). Between 
1990 and 2005, its annual rate of growth was 13.5%. 
However, intrasubregional trade is still limited compared 
with intraregional trade in Asia and the European 
Union for example. Whereas in the Andean Community 
the coefficient of intraregional trade (intraregional 
exports/total exports) is around 10%, in Asia it is one 
third and in the European Union, approximately two 
thirds (Rosales, Durán and Sáez, 2006). In terms of 
trade volume, the United States alone is a much more 
important partner than the subregion itself.
The AC countries also played an active part in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations and made major efforts to 
reduce and equalize import barriers on virtually 100% 
of their entire tariffs lines. Their active participation 
in the multilateral negotiations has continued to this 
day, chiefly because there are a number of issues 
at stake of special importance for improving their 
competitiveness, such as greater access to markets for 
agricultural products and the abolition of domestic 
support and subsidies in developed countries. This 
is why the Andean countries participate in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in a coordinated 
manner, especially on the agricultural issues mentioned. 
However, this is a slow process in which it takes a long 
time to reach consensus. On average, a multilateral 
round lasts six years, since countries, and particularly 
their entrepreneurs, need to expand their trade 
opportunities into new markets quickly, especially for 
products where they have a comparative advantage.
The scant success with negotiations within the 
multilateral trade system, following the scepticism at the 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun and the timid 
advances made at the Hong Kong Conference, has led to 
a wave of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. 
At present, the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
continue to negotiate a large number of preferential 
free trade agreements of varying types with countries 
from inside and outside the region. Between 2001 and 
2005, countries in the region concluded at least 10 new 
free trade agreements with countries in the northern 
hemisphere. This increased trend towards north/south 
agreements affected the Andean countries both directly 
and indirectly, since in a sense the proliferation of 
bilateral and multilateral FTAs reflected the frustration 
of many Governments at the slow progress made under 
the multilateral trade system.
II
The Andean Community’s trade policy and 
reasons for negotiating a free trade agreement 
with the United States
2 See Durán and Maldonado (2005).
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2. Andean Trade Preference Act, its expansion 
and trade between the Andean Community 
countries and the United States
The United States is the Andean countries’ leading 
trading partner. In 2005, 40% of the group’s total 
exports went to the United States and, in return, 26% 
of total imports into the Andean Community came 
from the United States. By contrast, total exports 
from the United States to AC countries account for 
barely 1.6%. Andean exports are mainly composed 
of petroleum and mining (54%), heavy manufactures 
(21%) and, to a lesser extent, light manufactures (13%) 
and agricultural products (7.6%). Fuels and petroleum 
by-products together represent 56% of exports, 
although sectors such as metals (7%), wearing apparel 
(6.5%), other crops and chemicals (each around 4%) 
also play an important role. Imports from the United 
States to AC countries predominantly comprise heavy 
manufactures, which account for more than 70% of the 
total. The machinery and equipment, chemicals, rubber 
and plastics and other manufactures sectors represent 
more than 60%. The machinery and equipment sector 
basically comprises capital goods.
One factor that has heavily influenced relations 
between the Andean countries and the United States 
has undoubtedly been the United States Andean Trade 
Preference Act (ATPA), which was expanded and 
replaced in 2002 by the United States Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), after 
the original act expired in late 2001. Despite being 
part of the United States trade policy, as both these 
legal instruments are unilateral, they have been central 
to the trade policy of the three Andean countries that 
have embarked on negotiations for the signature of a 
free trade agreement.
ATPA was approved by the United States Congress 
in December 1991, providing access to the United States 
market for 5,600 tariff headings and granting preferences 
to four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Peru). The aim was to provide them with better 
commercial alternatives to the illegal sale of drugs 
to the United States, as well as to contribute to their 
development and to the consolidation of democratic 
institutions in the four countries. When ATPA expired in 
2001, the United States Government approved ATPDEA 
to replace it. This new act was promulgated on 6 August 
2002 and conferred retroactive benefits starting from 
the date on which the former act expired.
The new act added around 700 products to the 
original list, increasing the number of products with 
free access to 6,300 (United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC), 2005 and 2006). The term of 
ATPDEA was extended from 31 December 2006 to 
June 2007. 
Between 1992 and 2005, exports from the Andean 
ATPDEA beneficiary countries grew fast as a result of 
improved access to the United States market, especially 
in the three-year period from 2003 to 2005. The 
products with the highest increases were basically raw 
materials, especially minerals, and manufactures based 
on natural resources, such as textiles and fuels (table 
1 and figure 1). In general, tariff preferences under 
ATPDEA form a large proportion of total exports from 
each country.
Exports from the Andean countries to the 
United States chiefly comprise primary products and 
manufactures based on natural resources. These sectors 
offset the deficit created by imports of intermediate 
and high technology manufactures, such as electrical 
machinery, accessories and parts and electronic 
equipment (table 2). 
3. Reasons for entering into trade negotiations 
with the United States
A combination of factors led the Andean countries to 
accept the United States’ invitation to start negotiations 
on a free trade agreement: (i) the small size of the 
regional market, representing no more than 10% 
of total trade; (ii) weak regional integration and a 
dearth of agreements at the time when consensus was 
reached on key issues such as final approval of the 
common external tariff and the deepening of trade 
in services; (iii) little or no probability of progress 
with the negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), which have technically been at a 
standstill since March 2004; (iv) scepticism about 
the feasibility of achieving speedy and conclusive 
results with multilateral negotiations; and (v) the huge 
importance of the United States as a trading partner 
for the AC3 countries. All these factors, combined 
with each country’s need to maintain predictable trade 
relations with their northern neighbour as the end of 
ATPDEA in December 2006 drew near, led Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru to accept the United States’ invitation 
to start trade negotiations for the conclusion of separate 
free trade agreements.
The negotiations began in Cartagena (Colombia) 
in May 2004. In 2005, there were 12 negotiation rounds 
involving three countries (Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru). Bolivia maintained observer status throughout 
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TABLE 1
Andean Community: main products exported to the United States
and percentages of use of atpdea, 2005a
(Percentages)
Country Main products by country Percentage of each  Country contribution to
 (% of the total under ATPDEA) country’s total exports total ATPDEA exports
 2001 2005 2001 2005
Bolivia Precious metals, zinc, nuts, shirts, cotton 
 fabrics, wood products (95%) 41.1 53.7 3.3 1.5
Colombia Petroleum and by-products, gold, coal, coffee, 
 bananas, textile products, plastics, aluminium,
 ceramics (96%) 50.5 50.6 43.1 41.8
Ecuador Petroleum and by-products, bananas, shrimps, 
 flowers, tuna, cocoa, cocoa butter (98%) 77.3 64.2 13.1 35.7
Peru Copper, gold, shirts, pullovers, petroleum, zinc, 
 silver, asparagus, coffee, mangoes (91%) 43.5 43.9 40.6 21.0
Four ATPDEA beneficiary countries  56.2 53.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors, based on official data from the United States Department of Commerce (International Trade Commission, 2005 and 2006). 
a  ATPDEA: Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (United States).
FIGURE 1
Andean countries: exports to the United States 
under ATPA and ATPDEA, 1992-2005a
(Millions of United States dollars)
Source: Authors, based on official data from the United States Department of Commerce (International Trade Commission, 2005 and 2006).
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the negotiation process, but did not actually join in 
the negotiations.
From the outset, the negotiations of the three 
Andean countries with the United States have been 
beset by political and social problems and setbacks. 
Some civil society groups were highly active in their 
determination to hold up the process, as they considered 
their governments to be making concessions to United 
States economic and geopolitical interests. In spite of 
the climate of unease and doubts about the viability 
and social legitimacy of such negotiations, Peru and 
Colombia concluded agreements in November 2005 
and March 2006, respectively, whereas Ecuador 
has postponed negotiations in an effort to reach an 
agreement more conducive to its own interests. 
4. An overview of literature on the subject
There has been a large increase in economic literature 
on measuring the effects of free trade agreements, 
prompted mainly by changes in the trade policy of the 
principal international trading partners. That is why many 
economists have focused their efforts on evaluating the 
possible effects of this greater trade liberalization.
Innumerable studies have focused on evaluating the 
effects of free trade agreements in the region, especially 
advance studies on the possible effects of the FTAA 
negotiations. A large number of these studies were carried 
out on the basis of rather large aggregations of sectors 
and regions. These studies included Cuadra and Florián 
(2005); Andean Development Corporation (2005); 
Argüello and Valenzuela (2005); Latin American 
Integration Association (2004); Argüello (2004); 
Diao, Diaz-Bonilla and Robinson (2002); Diao and 
Somwaru (2001) and Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis and 
Robinson (1997).
Monteagudo, Rojas et al (2004); Light (2003); 
Argüello (2004); Argüello and Valenzuela (2005); 
Andean Community (2005); Morales, Parada and Torres 
(2005) and Sepúlveda (2005) make specific references 
to studies on assessing the impact of FTAs involving 
Andean countries. Some impact assessments of free 
trade agreements consider only the country dimension, 
as is the case with Botero (2005) in relation to Colombia 
and with Morales, Parada and Torres (2004) in relation 
to Ecuador. The latter article was not written in a general 
equilibrium context.
The results of studies like these show that the 
changes which have taken place in trade are generally 
greater than those in GDP, with very little effect on 
welfare. Of the studies mentioned, only Cuadra and 
Florián (2005) conduct simulations that consider the 
long term by explicitly including dynamic elements 
that capture the effects of capital accumulation in the 
model. Their approach follows that of Baldwin and 
Venables (1995), François and McDonald (1996) and 
Walmsley (1998). In these cases, the results show 
that GDP growth may be greater than that achieved by 
applying static computable general equilibrium models. 
Obviously this leaves the debate open on the possible 
positive bias of dynamic effects in computable general 
equilibrium models.
TABLE 2
Andean Community: trade with the United States, 2004
(Millions of dollars)
Country Exports Imports Trade Opening of the trade balance according to technology intensity
   balance
 Raw Manufactures Low Intermediate Other
 materials  based on natural technology and high 
  resources  technology
Bolivia 360 260 99 31 127 99 - 144 - 13
Colombia 7 042 4 807 2 235 3 729 42 472 -2 434 426
Ecuador 3 265 1 323 1 942 2 682 168 - 58 - 847 - 4
Peru 3 604 1 981 1 622 170 1 713 692 -1 042 89
Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of)a 11 075 2 754 8 321 9 305 111 - 112 - 963 - 20
Andean
Community 25 346 11 126 14 220 15 917 2 161 1 093 -5 430 479
Source: Authors, based on information from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
a  Based on information for 2003.
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1. The model
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and 
database were used for the exercises in this study. It 
is a multiregional computable general equilibrium 
model, linked with a global database which, in 
addition to modelling trade flows between countries, 
includes an explicit treatment of the transport sector, 
a reconciliation system (or global bank) that mediates 
between the levels of savings and investment and a 
module that simulates the behaviour of demand from 
household consumption, from the production sector 
(intermediate goods) and from the Government, as well 
as the behaviour of primary demand factors (Hertel, 
1997; Schuschny, Durán and de Miguel, 2007). 
Version 6.1 of the model was used for the simulation 
exercises in this study. This is based on assumptions of 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. The 
model simulations are implemented numerically via the 
GEMPACK calculation software.3
To avoid the use of integrated social accounting 
matrices (SAM) for each country or region and to 
facilitate calculations of the equivalent variation,4 the 
model uses an “aggregate regional household” that 
collects income and taxes, pays subsidies and, via a 
Cobb-Douglas-type per capita utility function, allocates 
levels of spending, in constant shares, to private 
consumption (households themselves, which provide 
skilled and unskilled labour to firms), government 
expenditure and savings.
In addition to making a distinction between 
domestic and imported goods, consumers are able to 
distinguish between similar imported goods according 
to their origin (Armington, 1969). Under Armington’s 
assumption, imports are imperfect substitutes for 
domestic products. The behaviour of households 
is simulated with implicit uti8lity functions of the 
constant differences of elasticity variety.
The behaviour of firms (sectors) is shown as a 
“technology tree” (figure 2) which determines the 
primary demand factors (skilled and unskilled labour, 
capital, land and natural resources) and intermediate 
consumer goods, which can be produced domestically 
or imported (using Armington’s assumption). The latter 
can, in turn, come from a variety of sources (even 
though the elasticities of substitution are identical in 
all the countries included in the model). The supply 
of primary factors and intermediate inputs is based on 
the use of Leontief functions, and constant elasticity 
functions are used to determine their origin (domestic 
or imported) and, in turn, their demand by specific 
regions. The choice of how much to supply to the 
domestic market and how much to export is modelled 
with a constant elasticity of transformation function.
As the model is not enough on its own to explain 
investment behaviour, investment must be adjusted in 
accordance with regional changes in savings. As part 
of the model’s accounting closure, it is assumed that 
the current account may be other than zero but that it 
must be balanced with each country’s trade balances 
by means of a sort of global bank. 
Different closures of the model were used to 
change the baseline, as depicted in the ovals in 
figure 3, in accordance with Schuschny, Durán and 
de Miguel (2007). With respect to the free trade 
agreement simulations under analysis, and in order 
to avoid artif ices that would distort the model’s 
representativeness and its comparability with other 
studies, a standard or general equilibrium closure was 
assumed, in which all the markets are balanced, the 
benefits are zero, the agents’ budgetary constraints are 
met and therefore Walras’ Law is met.5
It remains for future studies (in particular a 
study of the exogenous trade balance, which permits 
a longer-term analysis) to explore other closure 
III
Description of the methodology
3 General Equilibrium Modelling Package. See Harrison and Pearson 
(1996).
4 Indicator that determines changes in welfare levels.
5 Even though this form of closure (the most standard type) has 
been adopted for this study, a simulation was also made of a case 
in which variations in the imbalance/equilibrium of each country’s 
trade balances were impeded, requiring additional adjustments in 
relative prices and hence in the real rate of exchange, in order to 
satisfy this macroeconomic constraint. That is to say, in this case a 
country cannot increase its pre-existing deficit or surplus after the 
simulated perturbation. As welfare outcomes were similar in sign and 
magnitude, it was decided to exclude it from this study.
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FIGURE 2
Production process of firmsa
FIGURE 3
Sequential methodology for updating trade policy data and 
scenarios for separate bilateral free trade agreements by 
three andean countries with the United States
Source: Authors, based on Hertel (1997).
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rules, the inclusion of rigidities in some markets, the 
unemployment context and economies of scale in 
specific sectors and to make a more detailed analysis of 
other effects, such as environmental and social ones.
The model comprises an extensive set of equations 
that are solved using non-linear programming methods. 
The Gragg method for the extrapolation of numerical 
solutions was used for the exercises. The results obtained 
subsequent to the simulation of the perturbations should 
represent the short or medium term effects of the 
liberalization agreements under study.6
2. Aggregation of countries and products
Version 6.1 of the GTAP database contains information 
on 92 countries (or regions), 57 products and five 
primary factors, and refers to the year 2001. For 
the simulations to be treated computationally and 
conducted within reasonable timeframes, it was 
necessary to aggregate the database and to confine 
the universe of countries (into regional groups) and 
products included in the simulation exercises. The list 
of products is presented in table 3.
The regional aggregation aims to respect the 
principal places of origin and destination of Latin 
American and Caribbean trade flows as individual 
regions. Thus, there are aggregations for 24 regions (17 
countries and seven regional aggregates).7 Production 
sectors were chosen according to three considerations: 
(i) the need to maintain a level of sectoral disaggregation 
that takes into account each sector’s share in exports 
from the countries in the region; (ii) uniform levels of 
protection of the products in each group and (iii) the 
limitations imposed by computerization of the model. 
The 57 products in the GTAP database were grouped 
into 31 products, as shown in table 3, which also shows 
the Armington elasticities.
3. Methodology used to obtain the benchmark 
scenario, taking into account  
the changes up to 2004
Version 6.1 of the original GTAP database fails to 
incorporate a number of trade agreements that existed 
prior to the base year 2001. For example, there were the 
preferential agreements between Chile and the countries 
of MERCOSUR as well as those between the MERCOSUR 
countries and the Andean Community countries. There 
were also the agreements concluded between the 
European Union and Mexico and between Mexico 
and Chile. This led us to update the original version 
of database 6.1 and to create a new updated database 
which we shall call “GTAP 2001 ECLAC baseline”. 
However, there are a number of drawbacks with 
using 2001 as the reference year for conducting the 
simulations of potential future free trade agreements 
because the scenario of bilateral trade agreements 
changed substantially between 2001 and 2004. During 
this period, Chile concluded a number of free trade 
agreements, including with the United States, all the 
European Union Member States and the Republic 
of Korea. In addition, Chile deepened reciprocal 
preferential access with MERCOSUR and the Andean 
Community. On 4 December 2001, the Andean Trade 
Preference Act (ATPA) also came to an end. The United 
States had approved ATPA for the unilateral benefit of 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and, as mentioned 
earlier, ATPA was later extended and broadened by 
promulgating the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug 
Eradication Act (ATPDEA).
For all of the above reasons, the starting scenario 
used for this study was a database for the year 2004, 
which we shall call “GTAP 2004 ECLAC benchmark”. 
This includes all the free trade agreements concluded by 
Latin American countries in force up to 31 December 
2004, as well as the benefits which the United States 
unilaterally conferred on the AC countries mentioned 
earlier. Figure 3 shows the technical specifications used 
to update the tariffs and to change the baseline from the 
one in the original GTAP 6.1 database for 2001, in order 
to gear it to the reality of the region in 2004. Figure 3 
depicts a sequence of three consecutive phases.
The details on how the benchmark scenario 
for the year 2004 was defined can be consulted in 
Schuschny, Durán and de Miguel (2007). Suffice it to 
say here that, during the first phase, actual tariffs in 
the original GTAP database were revised to 2001 and 
tariffs not included were updated, applying the AlterTax 
methodology detailed in Malcolm (1998). After this, 
6 According to empirical studies, the adjustment period for a new 
scenario or perturbation in the United States economy is between 10 
and 12 years (DeRosa and Gilbert, 2004). At the end of the study, 
some results of the impact that free trade agreements would have in 
the longer term in a steady-state-type configuration are shown.
7 The 17 countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, United 
States, Canada, China, Republic of Korea, South Africa, India, 
China and Japan. The seven regional aggregations are: the European 
Union (15 countries), the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CCEE), the rest of Europe, the rest of Asia, Central America and the 
Caribbean, the rest of Latin America and the rest of the world.
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TABLE 3
Detailed product aggregation in global trade analysis project GTAP 6.1
 No. Code Description based on the products defined Armington elasticities Sensitive products
   in the GTAP 6.1 databasea
 Domestic/ Imports  United Andean
 import according  States countries
  to origin
Agricultural products
 1 Arroz PDR (Paddy rice), PCR (Processed rice) 3.6 6.4  X
 2 Trigo WHT (Wheat) 4.5 8.9  X
 3 Ocereales GRO (Cereal grains n.e.c.)b 1.3 2.6  X
 4 FrutasVeg V_F (Vegetables, fruit, nuts) 1.9 3.7
 5 Semilloil OSD (Oil seeds) 2.5 4.9  X
Light manufactures
 6 AceiteVeg VOL (Vegetable oils and fats) 3.3 6.6  X
 7 Azúcar C_B (Sugar cane, sugar beet), SGR (Sugar) 2.7 5.4 X X
 8 FibrasVeg PFB (Plant-based fibers), WOL (Wool, silk-worm cocoons) 3.7 7.1
 9 Ocultivos OCR (Crops n.e.c.) 3.3 6.5  X
 10 BeyTa B_T (Beverages and tobacco products) 1.2 2.3
 11 Ganadería CTL (Cattle,sheep,goats,horses),
   OAP (Animal products n.e.c.) 1.5 3.0
 12 Carne CMT (Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse), OMT
   (Meat products n.e.c.) 4.1 8.3
 13 Lácteos RMK (Raw milk), MIL (Dairy products) 3.7 7.3  X
 14 Oaliment OFD (Food products n.e.c.) 2.0 4.0  X
 15 Pesca FSH (Fishing) 1.3 2.5  X
 16 Forestal FRS (Forestry) 2.5 5.0
 17 Textil TEX (Textiles) 3.8 7.5  X
 18 Confección WAP (Wearing apparel) 3.7 7.4  X
 19 CueroCalz LEA (Leather products) 4.1 8.1  X
 20 Madera LUM (Wood products) 3.4 6.8
Petroleum and mining
 21 Minería OMN (Minerals n.e.c.), NMM (Mineral products n.e.c.) 2.4 4.8
 22 Combustibles COA (Coal), OIL (Oil), GAS (Gas) 7.5 14.9
 23 Dpetrol P_C (Petroleum, coal products) 2.1 4.2
Heavy manufactures
 24 Química CRP (Chemical,rubber,plastic prods) 3.3 6.6
 25 Metal I_S (Ferrous metals), NFM (Metals n.e.c.) 3.4 7.2
 26 ProdMetal FMP (Metal products) 3.8 7.5
 27 MaquiEqui OME (Machinery and equipment n.e.c.) 4.1 8.1
 28 Autop MVH (Motor vehicles and parts) 2.8 5.6  X
 29 Etransp OTN (Transport equipment n.e.c.) 4.3 8.6
 30 Omanu ELE (Electronic equipment), OMF (Manufactures 
   n.e.c.), PPP (Paper products, publishing) 3.8 8.2
Services
 31 Servicios ELY (Electricity), GDT (Gas manufacture, distribution),
   WTR (Water), CNS (Construction), TRD (Trade), OTP
   (Transport n.e.c.), WTP (Sea transport), ATP (Air transport),
   CMN (Communication), OFI (Financial services n.e.c.), ISR 1.9 3.8
   (Insurance), OBS (Business services n.e.c.), ROS (Recreation
   and other services), OSG (PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat),
   DWE (Dwellings)
Source: Authors.
a  The names of the GTAP products have been left in their original language in order to facilitate their identification and the replicability 
of the aggregations. The information is available at www.GTAP.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/default.asp.
b n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified.
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the preferential agreements concluded between early 
2002 and late 2004 were incorporated. The results of 
this new database (GTAP 2004 ECLAC benchmark) are 
useful for filtering new scenarios, preventing undue 
effects from being attributed to the tariff preferences 
that would be obtained by concluding new free trade 
agreements.
4. Description of the simulation scenarios
Once the reference scenario had been updated, the next 
step was to analyse the potential impacts of the trade 
liberalization initiatives by Colombia, Ecuador and Peru 
with the United States. Three simulation scenarios were 
defined for this purpose:
(i) AC3-USA, full liberalization: Under this scenario, 
the tariffs of all tradable goods from Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru (listed in table 3) are considered to 
fall to zero for the United States and vice versa.
(ii) AC3-USA, excluding sensitive products: Under this 
scenario, some products imported by Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru, as well as by the United States, 
are considered to have zero tariffs, while others 
are not (table 3).
(iii)  No FTA/end ATPDEA: Under this scenario, it is 
assumed that, when the term of ATPDEA expires, 
no free trade agreement of any kind is signed. 
This means that the United States would once 
again close its economy to the products covered 
by ATPDEA. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru would 
therefore lose the preferential and unilateral access 
to the United States market that they had enjoyed up 
to that time. Even though this is considered to be 
the most pessimistic scenario, it could come about 
if the free trade agreements are not concluded or 
if the agreements failed to be ratified afterwards.
IV
Analysis of results
This section analyses the scenario in which separate 
bilateral agreements by Colombia, Ecuador and Peru 
are concluded simultaneously with the United States. 
The full liberalization version of the simulation 
scenarios is analysed in detail as a yardstick for 
comparison with the other scenarios. The results of 
all the scenarios are calculated based on the variations 
from the benchmark scenario created for 2004, referred 
to as “GTAP 2004 ECLAC benchmark”. It is important 
to reiterate that this scenario already incorporates the 
unilateral benefits conferred by the United States on 
the Andean Community countries via ATPDEA and 
the free trade agreements that were implemented by 
Latin American and Caribbean countries between 2001 
and 2004. The results of the different scenarios have 
therefore been filtered to remove the benefits or losses 
from any “preferences” granted previously.
The analysis was conducted in the following 
order: (i) macroeconomic effects on GDP, final demand 
components and income from factors of production; 
(ii) international and intraregional trade; (iii) sector 
analysis and (iv) effects on welfare and breakdown of 
these effects.8
1. Macroeconomic effects of the “AC3-USA full 
liberalization” scenario
(a) Effects
From the macroeconomic standpoint, although the 
signature of separate bilateral free trade agreements 
by Colombia, Ecuador and Peru with the United 
States has clearly favourable results on the signatory 
countries’ export and import trade, this does not lead 
to improvements in public and private consumption 
and nor does it influence investment demand to any 
great degree. In percentages, the Andean Community 
signatory countries increase their imports from the 
United States more than their exports to the United 
States, primarily because many of their products already 
benefit from tariff preferences under ATPDEA. Under 
this scenario, the impacts on the value of GDP therefore 
tend to be negative, even though they are insignificant 
for the AC countries. The chief reason is the negative 
8 Owing to the characteristics of this type of modelling, the results 
are presented in the form of variations in the value of the variables 
compared with their level in the reference scenario. For example, 
when mention is made of effects on GDP, this refers to a percentage 
variation in the level of GDP (one time only) and should not be 
understood as a growth rate or a change in the growth rate.
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variations in GDP price indices (price effect), since a 
minimum negative effect on the quantities is seen only 
in the case of Colombia (table 4).9
Ecuador is the hardest-hit country in trade terms: 
it presents the widest negative differential between 
what it gains from increased exports and what it loses 
from increased imports. Peru is the country with the 
highest percentage increase in trade, and, even though 
the effect on the trade balance is also negative, in its 
case the result is marginal. 
As regards the breakdown of the effects on income 
from the various factors of production, in all the countries 
payment/income from natural resources increases by 
0.7% compared with the benchmark scenario, rising to 
1.1% in the cases of Colombia and Ecuador. Land rent 
improves significantly in Ecuador (1.6%) and partially 
in Peru (0.6%) but worsens in Colombia (–0.8%). Wages 
for skilled labour and returns on capital worsen in all 
three countries, with Colombia the hardest hit country 
(–0.5% in both cases). Finally, there also tends to be a 
negative impact on unskilled labour in Colombia and 
Ecuador. However, if we weight the aforementioned 
effects in line with the factor structure of the existing 
added value, the AC countries suffer the negative impact 
basically via a reduction in payment to the capital factor 
(in the case of Peru it explains practically the entire 
effect) and next via the effect on unskilled labour. In the 
remaining countries, including the United States, there 
are no substantial effects.
(b)  Comparison with the macroeconomic effects in 
alternative scenarios
There is a possibility that the agreements might 
exclude a number of sensitive products or sectors, or that 
their liberalization might be postponed for several years, 
which would maintain their level of tariff protection. 
In this case, the negative impact on GDP is reduced by 
approximately 20% in Colombia and Ecuador, and a 
little less than 10% in Peru compared with the values 
shown in table 4, whereas the positive effects for exports 
and imports are also reduced by between 25% and 40% 
(table 5). Ecuador is the country that suffers the greatest 
proportional reduction in export growth and Peru suffers 
the least, whereas proportionally Colombia manages 
to mitigate the increase in its imports the most when 
sensitive products are included in the agreements.
In the event that separate free trade agreements 
between the three Andean countries and the United 
States are not signed, these AC countries would 
not have FTAs and would not enjoy the benefits of 
ATPDEA. In terms of the value of GDP, this scenario 
has a significantly adverse affect on Peru, with a drop 
in GDP of more than double that in the two previous 
scenarios (“AC3-USA full liberalization” and “AC3 
excluding sensitive products”). This is explained not 
only by a reduction in trade but also by a reduction 
in consumption, in terms of the demand components, 
and by a fall in income from factors of production 
(since from a tax standpoint this scenario is positive), 
as regards the source of GDP. The results for Colombia 
and Ecuador are less negative, especially in the case 
of Ecuador.
In addition, both the exports and imports of the 
three Andean countries would decrease compared with 
benchmark scenario 2004 by between 1% and 2% for 
Colombia and Peru (table 5). If we now analyse the gap 
between the two scenarios (“AC3-USA full liberalization” 
and “No FTA/end ATPDEA”), the situation would be 
even worse, with an aggregate reduction in exports of 
4.9% in Peru, 4.7% in Colombia and 1.4% in Ecuador. 
However, as the “No FTA/end ATPDEA” scenario is no 
TABLE 4
Macroeconomic impacts of the AC3-USA 
scenario: breakdown of GDP
(Percentage variation compared with benchmark 
scenario, 2004)
 Quantum Price Value
Bolivia 0.0 -0.4 -0.4
Colombia -0.1 -1.1 -1.1
Ecuador 0.0 -1.2 -1.2
Peru 0.0 -0.8 -0.7
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
United States 0.0 0.0 0.0
Argentina 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Brazil 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Uruguay 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Chile 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Authors, based on simulations modelled on version 6.1 of 
the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 6.1).
9 If we estimate the effect of the separate simultaneous FTAs by 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru with the United States, assuming that 
they never enjoyed the benefits from ATPDEA, the impact on the 
value of GDP would be positive in the case of Peru (0.8%), whereas 
for Ecuador (–0.7%) and Colombia (–0.3%) it would significantly 
reduce the negative effect on GDP value.
80
TRADE AGREEMENTS BY COLOMBIA, ECUADOR AND PERU WITH THE UNITED STATES: EFFECTS ON TRADE, PRODUCTION 
AND WELFARE  •  JOSÉ E. DURÁN LIMA, CARLOS J. DE MIGUEL AND ANDRÉS R. SCHUSCHNY
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 1  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 7
better for the United States GDP and trade, this would 
encourage the United States to negotiate an FTA even 
though its impact would be slight.
2. Impact of the “AC3-USA full liberalization” 
scenario on regional trade
The signature of separate simultaneous agreements 
by Colombia, Ecuador and Peru with the United 
States increases the total exports and imports of the 
countries involved and adversely affects the rest. To 
a large extent, the impact depends on each country’s 
trading-partner structure. For example, Mexico, Central 
America and the Caribbean and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela would be more affected by the changes 
in trade flows of goods caused by FTAs, given that the 
United States market represents respectively 89%, 50% 
and 42% of their trade (see table 5).
Thus, the AC countries’ principal trading partner 
is the United States, which absorbs an average 40% 
of their exports, whereas United States exports to 
the Andean Community represent barely 10%. Peru 
seems to be the country with the most diverse export 
destinations, whilst for Ecuador and Colombia, the 
Andean Community is more important than for Peru. 
It is also necessary to analyse the effects on trade 
between trading partners, as a result of the new order 
of preferential access and the new cost structure. The 
AC signatory countries will increase their exports 
to the United States, ranging from 3.8% in the case 
TABLE 5
Free trade agreements by andean countries with the United States;
effects on foreign trade
(Percentage variation from benchmark scenario 2004 and percentages)
 Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services United States in
   trade in goods (%)
 AC3-USA  AC3-USA  No FTA AC3-USA AC3-USA No FTA/ Exports Imports
 full excluding /End  full excluding End
 liberalization sensitive ATPDEA liberalization sensitive ATPDEA
  products   products
Andean Community 1.47 0.99 -0.61 1.96 1.40 -0.85 40.0 22.4
Bolivia -0.39 -0.12 -0.67 -0.47 -0.15 -0.91 16.4 13.8
Colombia 3.25 2.12 -1.36 4.02 2.77 -1.53 45.4 28.1
Ecuador 1.13 0.70 -0.26 2.00 1.51 -0.39 40.4 16.8
Peru 3.70 2.69 -1.22 4.32 3.22 -2.07 27.0 19.6
Venezuela (Bol.Rep.of) -0.19 -0.16 -0.03 -0.27 -0.24 0.00 42.0 31.2
United States 0.17 0.13 -0.03 0.14 0.11 -0.02 … …
MERCOSUR -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.14 -0.10 -0.01 19.6 17.0
Argentina -0.11 -0.06 -0.02 -0.17 -0.10 -0.02 11.1 14.7
Brazil -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 -0.13 -0.11 -0.01 23.6 18.3
Uruguay -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 12.0 7.2
Chile -0.21 -0.18 -0.02 -0.24 -0.21 -0.02 17.2 15.1
Mexico -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 88.8 56.6
Central America and 
the Caribbean -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 50.0 38.6
FTAA 0.15 0.11 -0.04 0.14 0.11 -0.03 30.8 14.3
EU15 + CCEE + EFTAa -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 11.0 5.8
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 28.0 14.0
Asia -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 23.0 10.0
Source: Authors, based on simulations modelled on version 6.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 6.1) and official 
information from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
a  EU 15 = European Union (15 countries); CCEE = the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; EFTA = European Free Trade 
Association.
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of Ecuador to 7.3% for Peru. However, the benefit 
of this greater access and the effect it produces is 
twofold: (i) increased competitiveness by Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru in third countries as a result of 
their access to cheaper imports from the United States 
and (ii) greater competition among the three Andean 
beneficiary countries of the agreements. Greater export 
competitiveness allows them to increase their exports 
to other destinations, both non-signatory AC members 
(Bolivia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) 
and the rest of the world, whilst increased competition 
among the three countries leads to a reduction in mutual 
exports averaging about 10%. In short, the result is a 
4.1% drop in trade within the Andean Community, 
whereas the United States increases its exports to the 
three signatory countries significantly (table 6).
3. Comparison of effects on regional trade 
under alternative scenarios (excluding “AC3-
USA excluding sensitive products” and “No 
FTA/end ATPDEA”)
Although the exclusion of sensitive products from the 
three free trade agreements does not modify the sign 
of the variations, it does modify their value. Thus, 
the increase in exports from the three AC signatory 
countries to the United States would be reduced overall 
to practically half: under this scenario exports from 
Colombia would rise by only 3.1% and those from 
Ecuador and Peru would rise by only 2.1% and 3.6% 
respectively. Similarly, exports from the United States 
to these countries would increase less (by 10, 9 and 14 
percentage points respectively), with exports to Peru 
continuing to benefit the most, with an increase of 53% 
compared with benchmark scenario 2004. The impact 
on trade within the Andean Community is positive 
compared with the scenario of excluding sensitive 
products (the drop decreases from 4.1% to 3.1%).10 
Under the “No FTA/end ATPDEA” scenario, the 
effects on intraregional trade change significantly. In 
addition to total exports falling slightly for all the 
countries compared with benchmark scenario 2004, 
the trade increase caused by FTAs is lost and there is a 
reduction in exports to the United States, partially offset 
by an increase in exports to third trading partners and 
(except for Ecuador) to the Andean Community. These 
effects are felt most forcefully by Peru. Practically all 
the countries in the Andean Community would increase 
their imports from the block, whereas the United States 
would reduce them by 4.4%, with Peru the most affected 
country (table 7). The United States would reduce its 
exports to the AC member countries very slightly, which 
in terms of its total exports is insignificant.
4. Sectoral impacts of the simulation scenarios
In this section, impacts on the value of exports and 
imports in all the simulation scenarios are disaggregated 
by sector and by country. Also, trade between the 
United States and the AC signatory countries is analysed 
at sector level. 
TABLE 6
“AC3-USA full liberalization” scenario: intraregional exports
(Percentage variation from benchmark scenario 2004)
 Destination
Origin Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela AC United Rest of Total
     (Bol. Rep. of)  States the world
Bolivia   -9.7 -10.4 -8.0 0.3 -5.1 1.5 1.0 -0.4
Colombia 4.6   -9.3 -10.1 4.8 -0.5 5.4 3.0 3.3
Ecuador 3.0 -12.0   -4.9 2.4 -6.3 3.8 1.4 1.2
Peru 3.2 -8.7 -10.3   2.7 -3.6 7.3 2.8 3.7
Venezuela (Bol.Rep.of) 0.2 -11.6 -8.6 -9.0   -10.3 0.4 0.4 -0.2
Andean Community 3.3 -11.2 -9.3 -7.8 4.1 -4.1 2.8 1.6 1.5
United States -1.1 43.4 45.8 66.6 -1.0 26.7 … -0.2 0.2
Source: Authors, based on simulations modelled on version 6.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 6.1).
10 The respective table has been omitted for reasons of space and 
because it is directly related with the previous table.
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(a)  Effects on the value of exports disaggregated 
by sector
The signature of free trade agreements between the 
AC countries and the United States has a positive effect 
on exports from the Andean block. Furthermore, this 
positive effect feeds through to all the major sectoral 
items, although the greatest variation (and contribution 
to the total impact) is in light manufactures, especially 
in the case of full liberalization (table 8).11 However, 
an examination of the specific sectors shows wide 
differences under this full liberalization scenario, 
whereas when sensitive products are excluded, the 
benefits of the agreements are more evenly spread 
among the sectors. 
In the event that no agreement is signed, resulting 
in the Andean countries losing the preferences conferred 
by ATPDEA, it would have a negative impact on total 
exports. This negative impact would be serious in 
the case of light manufactures, mainly the textile and 
wearing apparel sectors, exports of which would fall by 
more than 20% and 40% respectively compared with 
benchmark scenario 2004, which would only be partially 
offset by the increase in exports of petroleum, minerals 
and heavy manufactures.
(i) Colombia. After those from Peru, exports from 
Colombia benefit the most from concluding an FTA with 
the United States; however they are the most adversely 
affected by not signing one and losing ATPDEA 
preferences. Under the best scenario (AC3-USA full 
liberalization), the greatest growth in exports occurs in 
light manufactures, followed by heavy manufactures. 
Failure to sign an FTA and losing the preferences 
has a negative affect on exports of wearing apparel, 
textiles and leather products, which fall by more 
than 37%, 10% and 4%, respectively (compared with 
benchmark scenario 2004). However, exports from 
other sectors would increase: exports from the meat 
sector would increase the most (by more than 5%), 
whereas the increase in the chemicals, rubber and 
plastics sector has the greatest positive impact.
(ii) Ecuador. Among the signatories of an 
agreement with the United States, Ecuador is the 
country that increases its exports the least. It is also 
the country that reduces its exports the least should 
it lose ATPDEA preferences. Light manufactures are 
the biggest winners if an agreement is signed and the 
biggest losers if one is not signed. Heavy manufactures 
would experience the reverse effect. The sectors that 
would benefit most from an agreement in terms of 
increased exports are wheat (33%), provided that 
sensitive products are included, dairy products (13%) 
and forestry (4% to 5%), within the agricultural 
production sector, together with sugar (165%) and 
other food products, where no products are excluded 
(3%), wearing apparel (4% to5%) within the light 
manufactures sector, and transport equipment, within 
the heavy manufactures sector.
Exports of rice (–6%), other cereals (–16%) and 
oilseeds (–11%) present the biggest decreases within 
TABLE 7
“No FTA/end ATPDEA” scenario: intraregional exportsa
(Percentage variation from benchmark scenario 2004)
 Destination
Origin Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela AC United Rest of World
     (Bol. Rep. of)  States the world
Bolivia   -0.3 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.4 -12.6 2.1 -0.7
Colombia 2.4   2.5 1.4 3.0 2.7 -7.8 2.7 -1.4
Ecuador -0.2 -1.2   -0.4 1.0 -0.4 -1.6 0.8 -0.3
Peru 5.1 4.5 6.1   6.9 5.7 -18.6 5.8 -1.2
Venezuela (Bol.Rep.of) -0.9 -1.2 -0.5 -0.4   -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Andean Community 3.6 -0.5 2.1 0.2 2.9 1.5 -4.4 2.0 -0.6
United States -1.2 -1.5 -1.0 -2.3 -0.3 -1.0 … 0.0 0.0
Source: Authors, based on simulations modelled on version 6.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 6.1).
a ATPDEA:= Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (United States).
11 Without prejudice to the aggregate results in five major sectors 
presented in the tables in this section, information is available on 
the 31 sectors listed in table 3.
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TABLE 8
Various scenarios: sectoral breakdown of the effects on exports of an FTA between 
the United States and the Andean Community
(Percentage variation from benchmark scenario 2004 and each sector’s share in the total)
 Scenario AC3-USA AC3-USA excluding No FTA/ end ATPDEAa
  full liberalization sensitive products
Main sectors Changes Shareb Changes Shareb Changes Shareb
Andean Community
Agricultural products 1.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.0
Petroleum and mining 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.3 1.1 0.5
Light manufactures 5.4 0.8 2.3 0.3 -12.4 -1.5
Heavy manufactures 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.1 1.4 0.3
Services 1.2 0.1 1.1 0.1 1.9 0.2
Total exports 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 -0.6 -0.6
Colombia
Agricultural products 1.9 0.3 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.1
Petroleum and mining 1.1 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.4 0.4
Light manufactures 8.6 1.6 3.4 0.6 -16.3 -2.4
Heavy manufactures 3.7 0.9 3.4 0.8 2.8 0.7
Services 1.7 0.2 1.5 0.2 2.3 0.4
Total exports 3.3 3.3 2.1 2.1 -1.4 -1.4
Ecuador
Agricultural products 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1
Petroleum and mining 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
Light manufactures 3.7 0.8 1.9 0.4 -2.7 -0.6
Heavy manufactures -0.7 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 0.8 0.1
Services 1.0 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.1
Total exports 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.7 -0.3 -0.3
Perú
Agricultural products 0.9 0.0 1.2 0.1 2.3 0.1
Petroleum and mining 3.2 1.3 3.3 1.3 6.0 2.6
Light manufactures 6.2 1.9 2.5 0.7 -17.2 -4.2
Heavy manufactures 3.5 0.3 3.6 0.3 6.9 0.7
Services 1.4 0.2 1.4 0.2 4.1 0.7
Total exports 3.7 3.7 2.7 2.7 -1.2 -1.2
Source: Authors, based on simulations modelled on version 6.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 6.1).
a ATPDEA = Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (United States).
b This shows the variation in exports from each sector’s base level, weighted according to the sector’s share of total exports.
agricultural products. Meat (–15% to –20%) and 
textiles (–6%) present the biggest decreases among 
light manufactures, and chemicals (–4% to –6%) and 
metals (–6% to –8%) and the motor vehicles and 
parts sector present the biggest drops among heavy 
manufactures.
In the alternative scenario to conclusion of an 
agreement, where no agreement is signed and the 
preferences conferred by the United States via ATPDEA 
are also lost, exports of textiles and wearing apparel fall 
substantially, by 14% and 48% respectively, accounting 
for a large majority of the total negative effect.
(iii) Peru. Exports from Peru benefit the most from 
signing an FTA with the United States, thanks chiefly 
to sugar (in the case of full liberalization), other food 
products, mining and metals. Exports of rice, wheat, 
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dairy products and other manufactures also increase 
more than 5% (even though they make a minimum 
contribution to the total effect).
Should no FTAs be signed, the adverse effect 
on Peru’s exports is concentrated mainly on light 
manufactures, a sectoral grouping which decreases 
more in Peru than in the other AC countries. The second 
hardest-hit exports would again be textiles and wearing 
apparel. However, under this non-signature scenario, 
numerous sectors would increase their exports by more 
than 5%, although it is the increase in the petroleum 
and mining sectors which would do most to mitigate the 
adverse effects of this scenario on Peruvian exports.
(b) Effects on the value of imports disaggregated 
by sector
Under any of the simulation scenarios, the effect 
on imports from Colombia, Ecuador and Peru is greater 
than the effect on exports. The sectoral distribution of 
the increase in imports stems partially from the existing 
structure of these imports (table 9). Basically it is 
concentrated on heavy manufactures (between 50% and 
65%), followed very far behind by light manufactures 
(between 10% and 15%), whereas exports from AC 
countries, which are better distributed among the major 
sectors, concentrate more on petroleum and mining.
In the “AC3-USA full liberalization” scenario 
there is a major increase in imports of agricultural 
products (especially wheat), light manufactures 
(chiefly meat, wearing apparel and textiles) and heavy 
manufactures (particularly machinery and equipment, 
other manufactures and chemicals, rubber and plastics). 
Heavy manufactures account for the majority of 
the total effect. The inclusion of sensitive products 
reduces the increase in imports significantly, chiefly 
that of agricultural products and light manufactures, 
as well as that of many specific products (such as 
rice, vegetable oils and fats, dairy products, other food 
products, fish products, textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather products).
Failure to sign FTAs and the loss of preferences 
leads to a drop in imports (greater than in exports), 
largely attributable to a general decrease in trade 
which, in share terms, centres on the Andean block’s 
main import products, that is to say, heavy and light 
manufactures (especially textiles, chemicals, machinery 
and equipment and other manufactures).
(i) Colombia. An increase in Colombia’s imports 
as a result of signing an FTA with the United States 
occurs in all the major sectors, although the largest 
rises are in heavy and light manufactures and in 
agricultural products. The exclusion of sensitive 
products from the agreement reduces the increase in 
imports of agricultural products and light manufactures 
significantly. The sectors which cause the increase in 
imports are other manufactures (7.2%), machinery and 
equipment (5%), chemicals (3.5%), wearing apparel 
(43%), textiles (9%) and meat (52.5%). Although 
imports of wheat, other cereals, oil seeds, sugar, plant-
based fibres, wood and metal products experience rises 
of around 10% compared with benchmark scenario 
2004, they make a very small contribution to the total 
effect. If sensitive products are excluded from the 
agreement, the variation in imports becomes negative 
for the aforementioned sectors, with drops of more than 
3% in the wearing apparel sector, explaining the lower 
increase in total imports. Failure to sign an agreement 
and loss of ATPDEA preferences leads to a widespread 
fall in imports in all economic sectors, associated 
with the reduction in activity, with the textile sector 
experiencing the largest percentage decrease.
(ii) Ecuador. In Ecuador, the effect of the major 
sectoral items on imports is similar to that of Colombia, 
albeit with smaller variations and a reduction in imports 
from the large petroleum and mining sector. Under 
any of the scenarios where an FTA is signed with the 
United States, imports of machinery and equipment 
and other manufactures (in the heavy manufactures 
sector) account for half the increase in imports. 
However, significant increases occur in some items, 
including: meat (almost 40%) and dairy products, wood 
and wearing apparel (around 10%). The exclusion of 
sensitive products makes it possible to reduce imports 
to those sectors, which could even decrease imports 
(for instance, imports of dairy products and wearing 
apparel could fall by 1%). Under a scenario of full 
liberalization, only imports of rice and metals would 
decrease, and this by only around 2%. Except in the 
wheat and fishing sectors, failure to sign an FTA reduces 
slightly imports of all sectors fairly evenly.
(iii) Peru. Just as in Ecuador and Colombia, 
in Peru heavy manufactures is key to the increase 
in imports (chemicals, machinery and equipment, 
transport equipment (with a 22% increase) and other 
manufactures). However, the imports that increase the 
most are agricultural products (wheat by 11% and 
plant- and animal-based fibres by 12%) and some light 
manufactures, such as meat (30%), vegetable oils and 
fats (11%) and wearing apparel (8%). The inclusion of 
sensitive products makes it possible to avoid an increase 
in imports, as in the case of wheat and other cereals, or 
even reduce them, as with textiles and wearing apparel. 
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TABLE 9
Various scenarios: sectoral breakdown of the effects on imports of an FTA between 
the United States and the Andean Community
 (Percentage variation from benchmark scenario 2004 and each sector’s share n the total)
 Scenario AC3-USA AC3-USA excluding No FTA/ end ATPDEAa
  full liberalization sensitive products
Main sectors Changes Shareb Changes Shareb Changes Shareb
Andean Community
Agricultural products 3.6 0.2 0.6 0.0 -0.7 0.0
Petroleum and mining 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.0 -0.3 0.0
Light manufactures 3.7 0.5 0.6 0.1 -1.9 -0.2
Heavy manufactures 2.4 1.4 2.3 1.4 -0.6 -0.4
Services -0.9 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 -1.2 -0.2
Total imports 2.0 2.0 1.4 1.4 -0.9 -0.9
Colombia
Agricultural products 6.0 0.4 0.7 0.0 -1.2 -0.1
Petroleum and mining 2.4 0.2 2.5 0.2 -0.6 0.0
Light manufactures 9.6 1.1 2.0 0.2 -4.4 -0.5
Heavy manufactures 4.5 2.6 4.4 2.6 -1.1 -0.6
Services -1.3 -0.2 -1.1 -0.2 -1.7 -0.3
Total imports 4.0 4.0 2.8 2.8 -1.5 -1.5
Ecuador
Agricultural products 3.1 0.1 1.6 0.1 -0.3 0.0
Petroleum and mining -0.4 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Light manufactures 5.5 0.6 0.7 0.1 -0.7 -0.1
Heavy manufactures 2.5 1.6 2.4 1.6 -0.3 -0.2
Services -1.4 -0.2 -1.0 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1
Total imports 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 -0.4 -0.4
Peru
Agricultural products 7.2 0.6 1.3 0.1 -1.1 -0.1
Petroleum and mining 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 -0.5 -0.1
Light manufactures 5.1 0.5 0.3 0.0 -3.6 -0.4
Heavy manufactures 6.6 3.4 6.3 3.3 -2.0 -1.0
Services -0.8 -0.2 -0.9 -0.2 -2.6 -0.5
Total imports 4.3 4.3 3.2 3.2 -2.1 -2.1
Source: Authors, based on simulations modelled on version 6.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 6.1).
a ATPDEA = Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (United States).
b  This shows the variation in exports from each sector’s base level, weighted according to the sector’s share in total exports.
In the event that no FTA is signed with the United States 
and preferences are lost, Peruvian imports suffer a 
larger drop than the other AC countries, owing chiefly 
to a reduction in imports of machinery and equipment, 
other manufactures, chemicals and vehicle parts in the 
heavy manufactures sector, and of other food products 
and textile products, in the light manufactures sector.
(c) Trade between the Andean countries and the 
United States
Under any of the simulation scenarios, the 
differences between the effects on total exports and on 
exports from the AC block to the United States are low 
and affect the levels. Basically they consist of a larger 
increase in exports of light manufactures to the United 
86
TRADE AGREEMENTS BY COLOMBIA, ECUADOR AND PERU WITH THE UNITED STATES: EFFECTS ON TRADE, PRODUCTION 
AND WELFARE  •  JOSÉ E. DURÁN LIMA, CARLOS J. DE MIGUEL AND ANDRÉS R. SCHUSCHNY
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 1  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 7
States market. Much the same happens with imports, 
with the greatest differences between the world market 
and the United States market occurring in imports of 
heavy manufactures.
The signature of an FTA makes it possible to 
diversify exports to the United States more, since 
it increases the share of light manufactures to the 
detriment of petroleum and mining. A failure to sign 
an FTA and the loss of ATPDEA preferences would have 
precisely the opposite effect. The significant increase 
in commodity imports from the United States chiefly 
comprises heavy manufactures. However, the largest 
increases occur in light manufactures, providing that 
the AC countries do not exclude sensitive products. FTAs 
would have a diversifying effect on imports from the 
United States, although concentration increases when 
sensitive products are excluded from the agreement.12
5. Effects on welfare
The effects on welfare are measured by means of the 
equivalent variation, which is an indicator derived from 
calculating the total income level and incorporates the 
effects on changes in resource allocation among sectors 
and the variation in the terms of trade. In short, it 
measures how much income should be added/subtracted 
from the aggregate regional household13 to enable it 
to enjoy equal welfare before and after a variation in 
relative prices and the implications thereof. Note that 
the effects on welfare are aggregated at country/region 
level, which is why it is possible for reduced values to 
be masking much greater offsetting of values between 
winner and loser agents or sectors.
Given that the benchmark scenario 2004 estimate 
also includes the processes of trade liberalization that 
occurred in the region between the years 2001 and 2004, 
it is necessary to consider the impact on welfare that 
these processes have already produced. In particular, 
the benefits derived by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru from the United States ATPDEA preferences were 
manifested chiefly during the period from 2001 to 2004. 
This is why the equivalent variation is analysed with 
respect to 2001 (in millions of United States dollars14 
and as a percentage of GDP) under benchmark scenario 
2004 (first column of table 10) and all the simulated 
scenarios (remaining columns of table 10). After that, 
the additional effects obtained for each of the three 
countries under study are analysed with respect to 2004 
(table 11). The assessment of the impact on welfare is 
supplemented by a sensitivity analysis of the results 
of the equivalent variation for the “AC3-USA full 
liberalization” and “No FTA/end ATPDEA” scenarios, 
and by the results of two “dynamic” simulations for 
those same scenarios.
(a) Effects on welfare resulting from free trade 
agreements between AC countries and the 
United States 
In 2004 (according to the estimation process 
described in figure 3), AC countries benefiting from 
ATPDEA preferences increase their welfare by the 
equivalent of 0.1% of their GDP, except Peru, where 
the figure is 0.2%. Chile, which during that period 
concluded major FTAs with its main trading partners 
(Canada, United States, the European Union, the 
European Free Trade Association, the Republic of 
Korea and a number of Latin American countries), 
also shows a strong increase in its welfare (triple 
the increase obtained by the Andean Community), 
representing 1.1% of its GDP (result of the first column 
of table 10). The remaining Latin America countries 
suffer, indirectly, a relative loss of competitiveness (or 
erosion of prior preferences) compared with countries 
with new preferential access chiefly to the markets of 
the United States and Europe, which leads to slight 
reductions in welfare in MERCOSUR, as well as in 
Mexico and in Central America and the Caribbean. 
In any case, these reductions are not significant as a 
proportion of the respective GDP rates.
When the effects of the simultaneous signature 
of separate FTAs with the United States by Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru are added to these effects, the 
cumulative effects on welfare become negative in both 
Ecuador and Colombia, even when sensitive products 
are excluded (rest of table 10). In both countries, the 
negative effect on terms of trade heads the declines 
in welfare, although in Ecuador the effect of better 
resource allocation is positive. In Ecuador, the adverse 
effect on terms of trade is seen chiefly in the sectors 
of other food products, other manufactures and 
livestock, whereas in Colombia it centres on all heavy 
manufactures, textiles, wearing apparel and other food 
products. This adverse effect on welfare is offset by 
the other crops sector, especially in Colombia, the fuel 
sector and, in Ecuador, the vehicle parts sector.
12 For further details on the impact of trade with the United States, 
see Durán, de Miguel and Schuschny (2006).
13 See the description of the model in section III.
14 Note that these are reference values and are not equivalent to 
current dollars.
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TABLE 10
Effects on welfare with respect to 2001 under the following scenarios: 2004 
benchmark, “AC3-USA full liberalization”, “AC3-USA excluding sensitive products” and 
“no FTA/end ATPDEA”a
(Comparison of equivalent variations of cumulative effects from the year 2001, in millions of United 
States dollars 2001, and percentage of GDP in 204)
 2004 Full liberalization Excluding sensitive No FTA/end ATPDEA
 benchmark  products
 Millions Millions % of GDP Millions % of GDP Millions % of GDP
 of dollars of dollars  of dollars  of dollars
Latin America and the Caribbean 864 422 0.0 529 0.0 644 0.0
FTAA (excl. Mexico and Chile) 85 -285 0.0 -191 0.0 -150 0.0
Andean Community 229 -27 0.0 26 0.0 -27 0.0
Bolivia 10 6 0.1 9 0.0 2 0.0
Colombia 88 -75 -0.1 -40 0.0 -7 0.0
Ecuador 20 -11 -0.1 -3 0.0 5 0.0
Peru 121 78 0.1 85 0.2 -21 0.0
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) -10 -24 0.0 -25 0.0 -6 0.0
MERCOSUR -90 -179 0.0 -151 0.0 -98 0.0
Argentina -42 -78 0.0 -57 0.0 -45 0.0
Brazil -42 -92 0.0 -86 0.0 -46 0.0
Uruguay -6 -8 0.0 -8 0.0 -7 0.0
Chile 784 757 1.1 760 1.1 782 1.0
Mexico -5 -50 0.0 -40 0.0 12 0.0
Central America and the Caribbean -53 -79 0.0 -66 0.0 -25 0.0
United States -287 472 0.0 341 0.0 -183 0.0
EU15+CCEE+ EFTAb 752 607 0.0 612 0.0 790 0.0
Japan -104 -165 0.0 -146 0.0 -92 0.0
Asia -171 -269 0.0 -241 0.0 -83 0.0
Rest of the world -48 -196 0.0 -165 0.0 -68 0.0
World 1 005 872 0.0 930 0.0 1 009 0.0
Source: Authors, based on simulations modelled on version 6.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 6.1).
a The best scenario for the negotiating countries appear in underlined italics.
b EU 15 = European Union (15 countries); CCEE = countries of Central and Eastern Europe; EFTA = European Free Trade Association.
In the case of Peru, the effects on welfare remain 
positive, although they are worse with respect to 
benchmark scenario 2004. However, an important point 
to remember is that the negative net effect of an FTA 
stems solely from poorer terms of trade, since resource 
allocation actually improves. Remember that these three 
countries had benefited from market access preferences 
granted unilaterally by the United States, meaning that 
now the agreement involves greater relative assignment 
of its tariff reductions. The United States experiences 
an increase in its welfare, which is not significant as 
a proportion of its GDP.
The alternative scenario to the signature by these 
three countries of separate FTA with the United States 
would lead to a loss of ATPDEA preferences, which 
would cause a net reduction in welfare compared with 
benchmark scenario 2004, ranging from 0.1% of GDP in 
Colombia and Ecuador to 0.3% in Peru (table 11). This 
scenario even leads to a cumulative effect on welfare 
which, in the cases of Colombia and Peru, would be 
negative compared with 2001 (see table 10).
(b) Robustness of the effects on welfare: static 
conclusions
As the results do not allow for a conclusive 
recommendation on which is the best scenario in terms 
of welfare, it was necessary to verify the robustness 
of these results by means of a systematic sensitivity 
analysis of the Armington elasticities (of substitution 
between domestic goods and imports) in the “AC3-USA 
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TABLE 11
Net effects on welfare of the following scenarios with respect to 2004:a “AC3-USA full 
liberalization”, “AC3-USA excluding sensitive produccts” and “no FTA/end ATPDEA”
(Variations from the results of the GTAP 2004 ECLAC benchmark scenario, in millions of United 
States dollars 2001, and percentage of GDP in 2004)
 AC3-USA AC-3USA excluding No FTA/end ATPDEA
 full liberalization sensitive products
 Millions of  % of GDP Millions of % of GDP Millions of % of GDP
 dollars  dollars  dollars
Latin America and the Caribbean -442 0.0 -335 0.0 -220 0.0
FTAA (excl. Mexico and Chile) -370 0.0 -276 0.0 -235 0.0
Andean Community -256 -0.1 -203 -0.1 -255 -0.1
Bolivia -4 -0.1 -1 0.0 -9 -0.1
Colombia -163 -0.2 -128 -0.2 -95 -0.1
Ecuador -31 -0.2 -23 -0.1 -14 -0.1
Peru -43 -0.1 -35 -0.1 -141 -0.3
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) -15 0.0 -15 0.0 4 0.0
MERCOSUR -89 0.0 -61 0.0 -8 0.0
Chile -27 0.0 -24 0.0 -2 0.0
Mexico -45 0.0 -35 0.0 17 0.0
Central America and the Caribbean -26 0.0 -13 0.0 28 0.0
United States 759 0.0 628 0.0 105 0.0
EU 15 + CCEE + EFTAb -145 0.0 -140 0.0 38 0.0
Japan -61 0.0 -42 0.0 12 0.0
Asia -97 0.0 -70 0.0 88 0.0
Rest of the world -148 0.0 -117 0.0 -20 0.0
World -133 0.0 -75 0.0 4 0.0
Source: Authors, based on simulations modelled on vesion 6.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 6.1).
a The net effect discounts the result of the equivalent variation already obtained up to 2004 from the equivalent variation obtained under 
the different scenarios.
b  EU 15 = European Union (15 countries); CCEE = Countries of Central and Eastern Europe; EFTA = European Free Trade Association.
full liberalization” and “No FTA/end ATPDEA” scenarios, 
which are the two extremes (table 12). This sensitivity 
analysis consists of varying the Armington elasticities 
(keeping other conditions equal), with a uniform 
probability of up to 50% of their established value in 
either direction. It was decided to use the Armington 
elasticities as they are the most important ones in 
effects on trade, as well as variations in the terms of 
trade which, as we have already seen, are key to the 
final effect on welfare.15
As the results of the sensitivity analysis for the 
“AC3-USA full liberalization” scenario show (table 
12), the effects on welfare could become positive for 
both Colombia and Ecuador and are highly unlikely to 
be negative for Peru. Failure to sign agreements and 
the loss of preferences leads to negative results for 
Colombia and Peru and positive results for Ecuador. 
From the welfare standpoint in particular, it could be 
concluded that:
(i)  For the United States, the best scenario is 
unequivocally the one where the three AC countries 
sign agreements with full liberalization, and the 
worst scenario is the one where no countries sign, 
even though the United States would withdraw 
ATPDEA preferences. The impact is not important 
as a proportion of GDP.
(ii) For Peru, it is very clear that failure to sign an 
FTA with the United States and the loss of ATPDEA 
preferences is the worst option, since all the 
15 See the justification and methodology in Schuschny, Durán and 
de Miguel (2007).
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confidence interval values for this scenario are 
lower than any of the interval values for scenarios 
involving signature of an agreement. The results 
indicate that the best option is to sign an FTA.
(iii) Contrary to the United States and Peru, the results 
for Colombia and Ecuador are inconclusive. In 
Colombia, all the possible results of the “No FTA/
end ATPDEA” scenario come within the confidence 
interval of the “AC3-USA full liberalization” 
scenario. Furthermore, all the considered options 
have a robust negative result, meaning that the 
choice of any particular option will depend on its 
dynamic effects and on considerations other than 
purely commercial ones. 
(iv) The results for Ecuador are similar to those of 
Colombia, since the interval of the “No FTA/end 
ATPDEA” option comes almost completely within 
that of the “AC3-USA full liberalization” scenario, 
even though the latter could produce positive 
cumulative results on welfare. The result in the 
non-signature scenario is unequivocally positive 
but, even though it might be the best option, its 
scant value in terms of GDP does not give a clear 
signal for choosing it either.
(c) Gains in welfare when dynamic considerations 
are included: the effect of capital accumulation
In static models like the GTAP model, the potential 
benefits of trade opening derive more efficient allocation 
of production resources and of consumption of goods, 
as well as from the variation in the terms of trade as a 
result of this process. Estimates of the consequences of 
trade opening generally tend to be modest, leading to 
increases in welfare levels of not even one GDP point. 
However, the increases would be greater if the dynamic 
effects of liberalization were taken into account.
In an attempt to calculate the long-term benefits 
of trade opening, a steady-state model was recreated 
in which the capital stock can be adjusted, linking 
the return on capital with the cost of producing 
it. Schuschny, Durán and de (2007) explain the 
methodology used (based on François and McDonald, 
1996) for modifying the closure rules to incorporate the 
positive effects of capital accumulation on the results, by 
virtue of the fall in the relative prices of capital goods 
caused by tariff liberalization. We shall now focus solely 
on comparing the effects on welfare of the “AC3-USA 
full liberalization” and “No FTA/end ATPDEA” scenarios, 
after discounting the results of the GTAP 2004 ECLAC 
benchmark scenario (in this case also estimated in a 
steady state) for the two types of simulation: standard 
general equilibrium and steady state. The results are 
presented in table 13.
As can be seen, when we use the closure that 
recreates a steady-type state, which makes it possible 
(with certain limitations) to incorporate dynamic effects 
into the scenarios under analysis, the effects on welfare 
change markedly. The AC signatories experience a net 
positive effect on welfare which, in the case of Peru, 
could rise to as much as 0.4% of GDP and, in Colombia 
and Ecuador, could be in the order of 0.2%. For the 
United States, the situation improves slightly. For the 
AC countries, failure to sign the three FTAs and the 
loss of ATPDEA preferences increases the negative 
TABLE 12
Comparative effects on welfare according to a sensitivity analysis of the “AC3-USA full 
liberalization” and “no FTA/end ATPDEA” scenariosa
(Comparison of equivalent variations, cumulative effects since 2001, in millions of dollars)
Sensitivity AC3-USA full liberalization No FTA/end ATPDEAb
analysis
 Result Lower limit Upper limit Result Lower limit Upper limit
Colombia -75 -149 3 -7 -10 -3
Ecuador -11 -29 7 5 3 8
Peru 78 -1 173 -21 -24 -16
United States 472 364 586 -183 -236 -132
Source: Authors, based on simulations modelled on vesion 6.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 6.1).
a  Includes the upper and lower limit calculated on the basis of the average, and the standard deviation obtained from the sensitivity 
analysis.
b  ATPDEA = Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (United States).
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impact on Colombia and Ecuador significantly (to 
practically double) and on Peru even more (greater 
than triple).16
In static simulations, the results are governed by 
the tariff reductions stemming from the agreements. 
However, when simulating possible processes of capital 
accumulation that transcend tariff reductions and form 
part of a long-term context, in practice a series of 
policies and institutions are required to ensure that this 
TABLE 13
Equivalent variation: simulations under static and steady-state
general equilibrium conditions
(Variations from the results of the standard benchmark 2004 and “dynamic” 
scenarios respectively, in millions of United States dollars 2001)
 AC3-USA full liberalization No FTA/end ATPDEA
 Standard general Steady-state closure Standard general Steady-state closure
 equilibrium closure (dynamic increase) equilibrium closure (dynamic increase)
Colombia -163 156 -95 -185
Ecuador -31 44 -14 -26
Peru -43 214 -141 -485
United States 759 768 105 158
Source: Authors, based on simulations modelled on vesion 6.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 6.1).
investment actually takes place (such as legal security, 
proper infrastructure, trained human resources and 
promotion of foreign direct investment). Foreign direct 
investment is not included in the model. Although 
the signature of an FTA provides an opportunity to 
exploit dynamic advantages that lead to improvements 
in welfare, as this calls for an additional effort, it 




As empirical evidence has shown, the FTAs would have 
very limited effects on GDP (Markusen’s Law)17 and, 
as in any comparative statics exercise, the effect would 
be one time only. However, the impacts on trade are 
fairly positive for all the countries involved, except in 
the non-conclusion scenario (“No FTA/end ATPDEA”). 
In general, a positive effect is produced on exports, 
chiefly of light manufactures, with a simultaneous rise 
in all imports. The combined effect does not favour 
heavy manufactures or agricultural products from the 
Andean countries. In the alternative case (“No FTA/
end ATPDEA”), these countries concentrate more on 
producing petroleum and mineral products, with light 
manufactures negatively affected. However, it must 
be addressed that, because imports of machinery and 
equipment (which are the imports that increase the most 
if an agreement is signed) are bought at relatively lower 
prices, they can serve to stimulate investment, boosting 
the countries’ economic growth and competitiveness.
As regards welfare, the net effect of FTAs under 
static conditions tends to be slightly negative, although 
it is important to bear in mind that the benefits of 
the unilateral ATPDEA preferences received by the 
Andean countries have already been internalized. 
Therefore, when comparing the effects of FTAs, a 
possible alternative would be to conclude no agreement 
at all and to let ATPDEA expire. In such a case, the 
16 Even though the results obtained for the simulations in steady-state 
conditions with variations in the capital stock give us a guideline as 
to how the values of the economic variables would be affected in the 
medium or long term, they must be viewed with extreme caution, as 
explained in Durán, de Miguel and Schuschny (2006).
17 See François and McDonald (1996).
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benefits already achieved are withdrawn, with a return 
to higher tariffs for products included in ATPDEA. The 
main results for each country are as follows:
• When the dynamic effects are ignored, the 
results for Colombia are not at all conclusive 
when it comes to choosing the best alternative, 
since they all fall within the confidence interval 
in the sensitivity analysis of the “AC3-USA 
full liberalization” scenario. In any case, all 
the simulation scenarios of comparative statics 
produced negative results in terms of welfare. 
Therefore the choice of alternative is much more 
dependent on the dynamic effects, which are 
positive if an FTA is concluded.
• The static results for Ecuador are similar to those 
for Colombia, since all the scenarios have negative 
effects on net welfare. The “No FTA/end ATPDEA” 
option comes practically within the confidence 
interval of the “AC3-USA full liberalization” 
scenario, even though it might be the least negative 
option. However, if we consider the long-term 
effects under a “quasi-dynamic” scenario, the 
signature of an FTA has clearly positive results in 
terms of trade and welfare. 
• In the case of Peru, the expiration of ATPDEA 
preferences without the conclusion of an FTA 
is undoubtedly the worst alternative from any 
standpoint. The outcomes of the simulation 
exercises favour the conclusion of an FTA, especially 
if sensitive products are excluded. A quasi-dynamic 
exercise confirms these conclusions.
• For the United States, the empirical results endorse 
its trade policy strategy in favour of concluding free 
trade agreements because the greater the number of 
countries with which the United States concludes 
an FTA and the smaller the number of excluded 
sensitive products, the greater are the benefits it 
derives in all fields. However, once again, weighted 
for GDP, the results appear unimportant. 
While it is true that, in terms of aggregate welfare 
the results show reduced values, this masks important 
sectoral effects which, as history and economics have 
shown, cannot be easily offset by means of transfers 
from winners to losers (whose sectoral identification 
justifies studies like this). The exclusion of sensitive 
products from free trade agreements improves the results 
for the Andean countries, alleviating the impact on some 
of the most negatively affected sectors. However, this is 
not enough in itself, since the agreements establish new 
sectoral rules of the game which will partly determine 
the countries’ development paths.
Furthermore, the signature of an FTA incorporates 
numerous elements that are hard to quantify, such as 
gains in productivity stemming from greater access to 
technological improvements, or the beneficial effects of 
a possible improvement in the legal security of contracts 
or in the prospects of economic agents. Point 5 (c) of the 
previous section set out to analyse the dynamic impetus 
which FTAs can give to investment, showing that gains 
in welfare could be doubled. However, the model has not 
examined the economic changes that could be promoted 
by other active public policies (including institution 
building, promotion of competitiveness, improvement 
of infrastructure, training of human resources and 
protection of the environment and natural resources). 
While these policies could (and should) be implemented 
even in there are no FTAs, their effect would be greater 
if free trade agreements existed.
In other words, the figures in this article show 
that the conclusion of free trade agreements is no 
substitute for active development policies, and that 
doubts remain about the level of synergy that could be 
established between the application of such policies and 
the signature of free trade agreements. These are the 
areas on which public debate on free trade agreements 
should focus. This article helps to show that it is in those 
areas and in sectoral impacts, rather than in changes 
in the level of economic activity associated with tariff 
changes, that justification should be found for adopting a 
specific stance on the agreements and for identifying the 
characteristics that should be pursued when negotiating 
them, rather than solely the admittedly important issue 
of special treatment for sensitive products.
In addition, the results show that FTAs will also 
reduce intrasubregional trade and increase trade with the 
United States. In particular, Bolivia and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela would suffer losses in production 
and in exports to AC countries that negotiate agreements. 
Furthermore, a number of countries in the region, like 
Chile and Mexico, would suffer some erosion of their 
trade preferences in the United States market. To work 
along the “open regionalism” lines promoted by ECLAC, 
bilateral agreements must not clash with processes of 
Latin American integration and multilateral efforts. 
Greater uniformity of rules and disciplines between the 
different types of agreement is one of the prerequisites 
for preventing an asymmetric “hub-and-spoke” system 
of agreements. In any case, the continent’s solidarity 
should not be undermined and, with it, the chance to 
reach sustainable integration solutions.
Finally, in the specific case of the three free trade 
agreements analysed, the Andean countries possibly 
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face the dilemma of choosing between signing a trade 
agreement that balances the advantages conferred by 
the United States via ATPDEA, and not negotiating an 
agreement at all (regardless of its possible benefits), 
which, in principle, would mean forfeiting the 
preferential treatment which they already enjoy. This 
second scenario prevents negotiations being conducted 
without conditions and, to a certain extent, forces the 
Andean countries down the road of FTAs with the United 
States. If the United States really wishes to continue its 
policy of support for the region’s development (which 
would tie in with the commitments of the United 
Nations Conference of Environment and Development 
(Rio de Janeiro, 1992), the Millennium Summit (New 
York, 2000), the International Conference on Financing 
for Development (Monterrey, 2002) and the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 
2002)), and at the same time to progress with free 
trade integration, the first step should to be extend 
the term of ATPDEA for a prudent period, so as not 
to undermine the climate of negotiation. Even though 
two countries have already concluded negotiations, 
this is still a valid argument, as Ecuador has not 
yet completed its negotiations and a large section of 
Bolivia’s production sector depends crucially on exports 
covered by ATPDEA.
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